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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH TERRY SIEBOLD, "I 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
vs. j 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant - Respondent. 
Case No. 
10551 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST A TEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant, Joseph Terry Siebold, appeals from 
a Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Aldon J. Anderson, Judge, 
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Third Dictrict Court on November 19, 
1965. Pretrial was held December 3, 1965, and a hear-
ing was held January 6. 1966, before the Honorable 
Aldon J. Anderson. Judgment was entered January 
11, 1966, denying the petition based on the court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as 
presented in appellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT APPELLANT HAb 
BEEN DEPRIVED OF ANY FEDERAL OR STATE CON· 1 
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
A. APPELLANT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVED HIS LEGAL RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY EX· 
AMINATION. I 
B. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT APPELLANT WAS I 
DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The record shows that appellant and his co· 
defendant had discussed the matter of a prelimin· 
ary examination prior to appearing before the 
committing magistrate and that they had decided 
against it. (R. 64) It is clear from the record that the i 
committing magistrate, R. A. McConkie, justice of the ,, 
peace in Uintah County, advised the defendants 
of their right to a preliminary examination and the ; 
nature of preliminary examinations. Appellant was ' 
also advised that he had a right to counsel. (R. 88-89) 
Appellant thereupon waived preliminary hearing. 
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(R. 89) It is not denied that neither defendant was 
represented by counsel at this time. 
At the time set for arraignment in the Fourth 
Judicial District, Judge Joseph E. Nelson requested 
of the defendants whether they wished to be rep-
resented by counsel. They answered in the affirm-
ative and a continuance of thirty minutes was grant-
ed for a conference with Ray E. Nash, court appoint-
ed counsel. 
During that conference, Mr. Nash told both ap-
pei:ant and Mr. Desmarais that they had waived 
preliminary examination and that if they wanted 
one it would be granted by the court. Counsel then 
explained what a preliminary examination consisted 
of saying, "We will just merely parade their wit-
nesses and get all the story from all the witnesses 
they have." (R. 94) 
The defendants decided to plead guilty to the 
robbery charge because, as they said, "they got us 
dead-to-rights so there's no need to go into that." 
(.94) The defendants also decided not to have a pre-
liminary hearing on the charge of assault with intent 
to commit murder. (R. 95). 
Thereafter, appellant was given an additional 
opportunity to discuss at length with Mr. Nash the 
merits of the State's case against him; however, 
appellant again decided against having a prelimin-
ary hearing. 
Although appellant was not represented by 
counsel at the time he first waived preliminary ex-
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amin::ition, his failure to request a preliminary ex-
amination following appointment of counsel, who 
advised him that he could recall preliminary exam-
ination, negates his claim that he was denied his 
legal rights to a preliminary hearing. 
In McGuffey v .Turner. 18 U.2d 354 at 356, 423 
P.2d 166 at 167 (1967), this court, in reversing a 
District Court ruling granting a writ of habeas corr::-
us, stated: 
It is the practice in the trial courts of this state to 
remand a criminal case for preliminary hearing 
when the defendant requests it at arraignment when 
the preliminary hearing has been theretofor waived. 
It is rather difficult to see how a guilty defendant 
is prejudiced by waiving a preliminary hearing when 
all that is entailed at the hearing is that sufficient 
evidence be given to the committing magistrate to 
cause him to believe the defendant guilty thereof. 
This court has held in State v. Freeman, 94 Utah 1 
125, 71 P .2d 196 (1937), that bfore a defendant can 1 
be bound over to District Court he is entitled to a 
preliminary examination unless, with consent of the 
state, he waives such hearing. If such hearing is 
1 
waived, defendant thereby implies that the evidence , 
the State would have produced would have been 
sufficient to justify the magistrate holding him for 
arraignment. The defendant thereby consents that 1 
he be held for trial, and no witnesses need be pro· 
duced. 
Appellant cites Hamilton v. Alabama. 368 U.S. 
52 (1961) and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) 
for the proposition that failure to appoint counsel ; 
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prior to appellant's waiving preliminary examination 
requires reversal of the conviction even though no 
prejudice has been shown. 
In Hamilton, the court held that arraignment 
could be a "critical stage" when, as in Alabama, the 
defendant, if he is to raise the defense of insanity at 
all, must raise it then. InWhite, the accused, unrep-
resented by counsel at a preliminary hearing, enter-
ed a plea of guilty to a capitol offense. Thereafter, he 
entered a plea of not guilty at the time of his arraign-
ment. The plea of guilty was offered in evidence at 
the trial. The United State Supreme Court said that 
in view of the fact that a plea could be entered at 
the time of a preliminary hearing, and was in fact 
entered, a preliminary hearing in this situation was 
a. "critical stage." 
In DeToro v. Peppersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 
1964), the court ruled that under Maryland law, as 
modified since the White decision, a preliminary 
hearing was not a critical stage of the judicial pro-
cess as defenses not raised were not irretrievably 
lost. Therefore, failure to appoint counsel prior to 
preliminary examination did not violate the ac-
cused's constitutional rights. At 332 F.2d 343 the 
court said: 
In our view, Hamilton and White teach that an 
accused is denied rights afforded him under the 
sixth amendment when he is subjected to an ar-
raignment or to a preliminary hearing without the 
assistance of counsel, where events transpire that 
are likely to prejudice his ensuing trial .... 
. . , the thrust of Powell's [Powell v. Alabama, 287 
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U.S. 45 (1932) J admonition that an accused has a 
right to counsel 'at every step in the proceedings 
against him,' as borne out by subsequent decisions 
including Hamilton and White, seems to be that 
if the effectivness of legal assistance ultimately 
furnished an accused is likely to be prejudiced by its 
prior denial, the earlier period may be deemed a 
critical stage in the judicial process and a conviction 
obtained in such circumstances is rendered invalid, 
We find nothin gin the Supreme Court decisions, 
however, that would permit us to extend the duty 
of the State to appoint counsel in proceedings where 
even the likelihood of later prejudice arising from 
the failure to appoint is absent. 
It should be noted that the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Latham v. Crouse, 
320 F.2d 120 (1963), handed down subsequent to 
both White and Hamilton, ruled that an accused has 
no constitutional right to be furnished counsel at a 
preliminary hearing in a state court capital case. In 
that case, two individuals by the names of Latham 
and York were responsible for a series of killings 
throughout the United States, and were tried and 
convicted of murder in Kansas after being appre-
hended in Utah. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied on its previous decision in Utah v. Sullivan, 
227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1952), stating: 
The first contention is that petitioners were entitled 
to have counsel appointed for them prior to the pre-
liminary examination. Heavy reliance is placed ~n 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court m 
Gideon v. Wainwright, Corrections Director, 372 
U.S. 385, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. That case 
concerned the right of an accused to counsel at 
trial - not at a preliminary hearing. In State v. 
Sullivan, in State of Utah v. Sullivan, 10 Cir., 227 
F.2d 511, 513, certiorari denied, sub nom. Braasch 
v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973 S.Ct. 449, 100 L.Ed 844, we 
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held that in circumstances where an accused did 
not enter a plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing, 
did not make a confession, did not testify and did 
not say anything of an incriminating nature, the 
failure to furnish counsel at such hearing did not 
abridge that accused's fundamental constitutional 
rights. That decision is controlling here. No claim 
is made of any incriminating statements or acts of 
ths petitioner at the preliminary examination. All 
they did was waive the right to a preliminary hear-
ing. Prejudice is asserted on the ground that counsel 
would have forced the prosecution to disclose at 
least some of its evidence. The point is not well 
taken as more than a month in advance of trial 
copies of the confessions and list of the prosecution 
witnesses were given defense counsel. Our conclus-
ions in State of Utah v. Sullivan are supported by 
the decisions of other circuits. We find nothing in 
Gideon v. Wainwright which requires a review of 
the decision in State of Utah v. Sullivan. 
This holding was reiterated recently in Lovato 
v. Cox, 344 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1965) a per curium 
opinion. The court noted that the preliminary pro 
ceedings were entirely independent of the prison-
er's formal arraignment and sentencing, and at the 
time of preliminary hearing, the prisoner had al-
ready signed a statement. He appeared before a 
justice of the peace without counsel and thereafter 
at the time or arraignment entered a plea of guilty. 
The court concluded the prisoner was in no way 
deprived of any constitutional right. 
It is submitted that under Utah law a prelim-
inary hearing is not a "critical stage" and that appel-
lant was in no way denied his constitutional rights 
when without counsel he first waived preliminary 
hearing. 
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Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 385 (1963), is 
not in point. "That case concerned the right of an 
accused to counsel at trial-not a preliminary he3J-
ing." Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (1963). 
In State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 224 P.2d 28G 
(1951), the court held, as appellant acknowledges, 
that the failure to have counsel for preliminary hear-
ing was not prejudicial. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16-2 (1953) provides: 
No defect or irregularity in or want or absence of 
any proceeding or statutary requirement, prior to 
the filing of an information or indictment, includ-
ing the preliminary hearing, shall constitute pro-
judical error and the defendant shall be conclusively 
presumed to have waived any such defect, irregular-
ity, want or absence of proceeding of statutory 
requirement, unless he shall before pleading to the 
information or indictment specifically and expressly 
object to the information or indictment on such 
ground ... (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant asserts that he was prejudiced on the 
ground that preliminary examination would have 
forced the State to disclose some of its evidence. It 
is submitted that the point is not well taken as appe'.-
lant pleaded guilty to the charge of robbery because 
he knew he was guilty and that the State could 
prove it. 
Appellant entered his plea of guilty to the 
charge of assult with intend to commit murder after .1 
three weeks during which time appellant's attorney 
interviewed witnesses and looked into the State's 
case. It was on the advice of appellant's attorney to 1 
the effect that the State had a strong case against , 
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him that appellant changed his plea from not guilty 
to guilty. See Latham v. Crouse. pages 7 and 8. Ap-
pellant has not demonstrated that he was in any way 
prejudiced by the proceedings in this case. 
Respondent submits that defendant's unsuport-
ed testimony is not sufficient proof to establish ap-
pellant's contention that he did not intelligently and 
voluntarily waive preliminary hearing. 
This court in McGuffey v. Turner. 18 U.2 354 at 
:359, 423 P.2d 166 at 169 (1967), cites favorably the 
Kansas case of Wilson v. Hand. 181 Kan. 483, 311 
P.2d 1009 (1957), which said: 
The rule is well established that the stand!lrrl of 
proof necessary to justify the issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus is not met by uncorroborated and un-
supported statements of the petitioner. 
It is submitted that where the petitioner relies on 
his testimony and that of his co-defendant to estab-
lish that he did not intelligently and voluntarily 
waive preliminary hearing, the burden of proof is 
not met where there is reliable testimony to the con-
trary indicating that they did intelligently and vol-
untarily waive preliminary hearing. In the instant 
case, the testimony of Ray E. Nash demonstrates 
that appellant did intelligently and voluntarily waive 
preliminary hearing. 
In support of his contention that he was pre-
judiced by waiving preliminary hearing without the 
advise of counsel, appellant cites Harvey v. State of 
Mississippi. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.) (1965); Carnley v. 
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Cochran. 369 U.S. 506 (1962); and Doughty v. Max-
well, 376 U.S. 202 (1964). 
Respondent submits that the decision in Harvey 
is not in point as Harvey, a Negro, did not obtain 
counsel until after he had entered a plea of guilty 
to the charge of illegal possession of whisky, which 
plea, when accepted, became final. 
Carnley is not in point as the case deals with thE 
right to counsel at trial and the decision holds that a 
waiver of right to counsel cannot be presumed from 
a silent record. 
Nor is Doughty v. Maxwell. supra, in point. See 
Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d. 368 
(1962). Doughty was indicted by a grand jury for 
rape and, after psychiatric examination, pleaded 
guilty without the aid of counsel. The United States 
Supreme Court relies on Carnley v. Cochran. supra, 
and Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, for its decision 
in this case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN EXCLUDING FROM THE RECORD ALL REF-
ERENCE TO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS EXCEP'T 
AS THEY MIGHT EFFECT APPELLANT'S PLEAS OF 
GUILTY. 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ex-
cluding all reference to appellant's waiver of extra-
dition to California and his subsequent waiver of ex-
tradition back to Utah between the time of his arrest 
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on August 3, 1964, and pronouncement of judgment 
on September 9, 1964. 
In State v. Stewart, 87 Idaho 210, 392 P.2d 180 
(1964), the court held that the forum state may try the 
accused regardless of the manner in which he is re-
turned to the state. 
In Thompson v. State, 197 Kan. 360, 419 P.2d 891 
(1966), the court held that the jurisdiction of the 
Kansas district court to the person on a charge of 
having committed a public offense does not depend 
on how he came into the state. 
In People v. Wilson, 106 C.A.2d 716, 236 P.2d 9 
(1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 915 (1962), the California 
Court of Appeals said that jurisdiction over the per-
son of an accused is not affected by the way it is 
acquired, or the manner by which the accused is 
brought into the court. 
In State v. Wise, 58 N.M. 164, 267 P.2d 992 (1954), 
the New Mexico Supreme Court said that where a 
person accused of a crime is found within a terri-
torial jurisdiction where he is charged, the jurisdic-
tion of the court where the charge is pending is not 
impaired by the fact that the defendant is brought 
from another jurisdiction by illegal means. 
Respondent submits that it is the purpose of 
extradition proceedings to prevent the successful 
escape of any person who has been accused of a 
crime; and, since this is the purpose of extradition 
Proceedings, it is submitted that none of the appel· 
lant' s constitutional and legal rights were violated. 
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Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 657, cert. den. 340 
U.S. 828 (1950). 
A person who has been extradited from one 
state to another and then subsequently extradited 
and brought back to the first state cannot, after he 
is once again held by the first state, inquire into the 
legality of his extradition back to that state, or into 
the right of the first state to his custody after his 
committment to a penal institution therein. Dear v. 
State of Ohio. 107 F.Supp. 937 (D.C.W.VA. 1952). See 
also 35 C.J.S. Extradition§ 2l(b). 
Respondent submits that appellant, as a matter 
of record, was within the jurisdiction and the preLl-
ence of the court which arraigned and pronounced 
sentence on him. There was no way, as a matter 
of law, for appellant to challenge the court's juris-
diction over him. It is submitted, therefore, that the 
trial court did not err in refusing to allow the issue 
of jurisdiction to be brought before the court except 
as it might affect a.ppellant' s pleas of guilty to the 
crimes charged. Respondent submits that the trial 
court's order should be affirmed. 
Even had appellant raised the issue of jurisdic-
tion in the trial court, he could not have successfully 
argued that Utah, by allowing California authorities 
to extradite him, had waived jurisdiction. Utah 
Code Ann.§ 77-56-25 (c) (1953) provides: 
Nothing in this act contained shall be deemed to 
constitute a waiver by the state of its right, power 
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or privilege to try such demanded person for crime 
committed within this state, or of its right, power 
or privilege to regain custody of such person by 
extradition proceedings or otherwise for the purpose 
of trial, sentence or punishment for any crime com-
mitted in this state, or shall any proceedings had 
under this act which result in extradition be deemed 
a waiver by this state of any of it's rights, privileges 
or jurisdiction in any way whatsoever. 
This staute is a part of the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act and has also been adopted by Cali-
fornia. See California Penal Code § 1555.2. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in In Re Satterfield. 50 Cal. 
Rptr. 284, 412 P.2d 540 (1966), said that a waiver of 
Jurisdiction is not to be automatically implied in all 
cases where the state transfers a prisoner to the 
custody of another sovereign. The state shall not be 
deemed to have waived jurisdiction unless evidence 
demonstrates an intentional waiver. 
It appears that under Utah law the state did 
not waive jurisdiction over the appellant when it 
allowed extradition to California. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellant voluntarily 
and intelligently waived his right to preliminary 
hearing. Further, a preliminary hearing is not a 
"critical stage" of the proceeding and appellant has 
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his 
waiver thereof. The trial court did not err by refusing 
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to allow into evidence any of the extradition pro. 
ceedings. Respondent submits that the trial court's 
denial of appellant's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
